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The Interrogation Trilogy and the 
Protections for Interrogated Suspects 
in Canadian Law 
Lisa Dufraimont* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The recent case of R. v. Sinclair1 constitutes the third instalment in 
the so-called “interrogation trilogy” from the Supreme Court of Canada.2 
The first case in the trilogy, R. v. Oickle,3 outlined the limits on police 
interrogation imposed by the common law confessions rule. Then, in  
R. v. Singh,4 the Court addressed the constitutional right to silence and its 
operation in the interrogation context, including its relationship with the 
confessions rule. Finally, in Sinclair, the Supreme Court has explained 
how the constitutional right to counsel applies in the context of police 
questioning a detainee. These three cases span more than a decade and 
touch on different rules and rights under the common law and the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.5 But taken together, the 
trilogy lays out the basic framework of legal safeguards available to 
interrogated suspects under Canadian law. 
Reaction to the cases in the trilogy has been swift, strong and mainly 
negative. The primary criticism levelled by commentators — which was 
also a concern of the dissenting judges in each case — is that the Supreme 
Court decisions making up the interrogation trilogy do not go far enough 
                                                                                                             
*  Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Queen’s University. 
1  [2010] S.C.J. No. 35, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 310, 77 C.R. (6th) 203 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sin-
clair”]. 
2  The phrase “interrogation trilogy” was coined by Binnie J. in Sinclair, id., at para. 77. 
3  [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, 147 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Oickle”].  
4  [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 405, 51 C.R. (6th) 199 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Singh”]. 
5  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
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to safeguard suspects and control police abuses in the interrogation room.6 
No doubt there are real questions about whether the Supreme Court’s 
pronouncements on interrogation have struck the right balance between 
state power and individual rights. At the same time, it seems important to 
avoid focusing so much on the protections the law does not provide to 
interrogated suspects that the protections the law does provide are 
forgotten.  
This paper aims to assess the interrogation trilogy and its impact on 
the procedural safeguards surrounding police interrogation, with particu-
lar emphasis on the effect of the recent decision in Sinclair. The analysis 
will focus on interrogation in the ordinary scenario where the suspect 
knows he or she is interacting with police; undercover operations raise 
different issues that go beyond the scope of this paper. Regarding the 
protections available to suspects in the ordinary interrogation case, it will 
be argued that despite the strong reaction from critics, the interrogation 
trilogy has done little to change Canadian law. The Supreme Court has 
now clearly rejected the idea that detainees should be permitted to cut off 
interrogation by invoking Charter rights, and the implications of that 
rejection will be discussed. The interrogation trilogy has also firmly 
established the confessions rule as the central safeguard available to 
interrogated suspects. Legitimate concerns have been raised about the 
vitality of the confessions rule as a protection for individuals subjected to 
police interrogation, but it will be argued that there are advantages to 
privileging the confessions rule in this way.  
II. OVERVIEW OF THE INTERROGATION TRILOGY 
Before analyzing the current state of the law, it will be useful to re-
view the Supreme Court’s decisions in the interrogation trilogy. The 
                                                                                                             
6  See, e.g., Don Stuart, “Sinclair Regrettably Completes the Oickle and Singh Manual for 
Coercive and Lawless Interrogation” (2010) 77 C.R. (6th) 303 [hereinafter “Sinclair Regrettably”]; 
Christine Boyle, “R. v. Sinclair: A Comparatively Disappointing Decision on the Right to Counsel” 
(2010) 77 C.R. (6th) 310 [hereinafter “Boyle”]; Dale E. Ives & Christopher Sherrin, “R. v. Singh — 
A Meaningless Right to Silence with Dangerous Consequences” (2007) 51 C.R. (6th) 250 
[hereinafter “Ives & Sherrin”]; Edmund Thomas, “Lowering the Standard: R. v. Oickle and the 
Confessions Rule in Canada” (2005) 10 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 69 [hereinafter “Thomas”]; Dale E. Ives, 
“Preventing False Confessions: Is Oickle Up to the Task?” (2007) 44 San Diego L. Rev. 477 
[hereinafter “Ives”]; Don Stuart, “Oickle: The Supreme Court’s Recipe for Coercive Interrogation” 
(2000) 36 C.R. (5th) 188. 
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judgments in Oickle, Singh and the recent case of Sinclair will be 
discussed in turn. 
1. R. v. Oickle and the Confessions Rule 
The confessions rule has deep roots in the common law of evidence, 
dating back more than 200 years.7 It remains a vital part of Canadian law, 
requiring that any out-of-court statement made by an accused person to a 
person in authority be excluded from evidence unless the prosecution 
proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was made voluntar-
ily.8 The Supreme Court reaffirmed the confessions rule in Oickle,9 and 
that case provides extensive guidance on the factors that should be 
considered in the analysis of voluntariness. 
Oickle involved the interrogation of a suspect in a series of arsons. 
The suspect, Oickle, submitted to a polygraph test to probe his involve-
ment, if any, in the fires. The polygraph test was administered in the 
afternoon, after which the police immediately began a series of interroga-
tions lasting late into the night. The police employed numerous tactics 
calculated to put pressure on Oickle to confess. For example, they 
exaggerated the reliability of the polygraph, repeatedly claiming that 
because Oickle failed the test they already knew him to be guilty.10 They 
also suggested to Oickle that if he did not confess, they might have to 
interrogate his fiancée or subject her to a polygraph examination.11 
Oickle made various self-incriminating statements and, ultimately, about 
eight hours into his interaction with police, he confessed to setting seven 
of the eight fires under investigation. He later participated in a re-
enactment at the scene of each fire. The trial judge admitted Oickle’s 
statements, having determined that they were voluntary in all the 
circumstances, and Oickle was convicted. The Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal held that the statements were involuntary and should have been 
excluded, quashed the convictions and entered acquittals on all counts.  
                                                                                                             
7  On the origins of the confessions rule in 18th-century England, see John H. Langbein, 
The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), at 220-21. 
8  See, e.g., R. v. Hodgson, [1998] S.C.J. No. 66, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 449, at para. 12 (S.C.C.). 
It is worth noting that this rule only applies where the accused knows he or she is talking to a 
“person is authority”; statements made in undercover operations are not covered by the confessions 
rule. 
9  Supra, note 3. 
10  Id., at para. 84. 
11  Id., at para. 94. 
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The Supreme Court allowed the appeal by a 6-1 majority and rein-
stated Oickle’s convictions. The judgment of the majority was delivered 
by Iacobucci J., who took the opportunity to elucidate the scope of the 
confessions rule. He explained that, even in the Charter era, the confes-
sions rule continues to apply as a matter of common law; the protections 
for the accused under the Charter co-exist with the confessions rule, and 
neither wholly subsumes the other.12 Justice Iacobucci further explained 
that a restatement of the confessions rule was needed to respond to the 
growing consciousness of the danger of false confessions. A primary 
reason to exclude involuntary confessions is that they may be unreliable, 
and the confessions rule should be informed by knowledge of the kinds 
of interrogation techniques that are prone to produce false confessions.13 
Ultimately, Iacobucci J. stressed that the confessions rule should be 
defined with a view to the twin objectives of “protecting the rights of the 
accused without unduly limiting society’s need to investigate and solve 
crimes”.14 
Justice Iacobucci explained that the confessions rule focuses on 
“voluntariness, broadly understood”.15 Bright line rules are inconsistent 
with the contextual nature of the voluntariness inquiry; trial judges must 
consider all the circumstances to make the determination.16 Among the 
factors that can alone or taken together vitiate the voluntariness of a 
confession are express or implied threats or promises from the authori-
ties17 and oppressive circumstances in the interrogation, as where the 
questioning is intimidating and prolonged or the interrogators withhold 
sleep, food or water.18 A confession will also be involuntary when 
obtained from a suspect who lacked an operating mind.19 These factors 
should be considered together as elements of the larger voluntariness 
inquiry. Finally, the confessions rule requires a separate inquiry into 
police trickery: where the police use tactics that would shock the con-
science of the community, any resulting confession should be excluded 
on that ground alone.20  
                                                                                                             
12  Id., at para. 31. 
13  Id., at para. 32. 
14  Id., at para. 33. 
15  Id., at para. 27. 
16  Id., at paras. 47, 68. 
17  Id., at paras 48-57. 
18  Id., at paras. 58-62. 
19  Id., at paras. 63-64. 
20  Id., at paras. 65-67. 
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According to Iacobucci J., where a trial judge arrives at a conclusion 
on voluntariness after properly considering the totality of the circum-
stances, that finding is essentially factual and entitled to deference.21 In 
the view of the majority, such was the case on the facts of Oickle. While 
several features of the interrogation potentially raised voluntariness 
issues, there was no error in the trial judge’s analysis of voluntariness 
and no basis to overturn her finding on appeal.22 Justice Arbour, writing 
in dissent, took a very different view of the interrogation, finding that 
Oickle’s statements were made in response to various improper induce-
ments from the authorities and unfair use of the “failed” polygraph.23  
2. R. v. Singh and the Right to Silence 
The Charter does not explicitly mention the right to silence, but the 
Supreme Court has recognized that this right is protected under section 
7.24 Writing for seven members of the Court in the landmark case of R. v. 
Hebert,25 McLachlin J. explained that the right to silence is, in essence, 
the right to choose freely whether or not to speak with authorities.26 
Hebert involved a detainee who refused to speak with police but was 
tricked into making incriminating statements by an undercover officer 
placed in his cell. In these circumstances, the police effectively negated 
the accused’s choice to remain silent and violated his section 7 rights.27  
From the outset, the section 7 pre-trial right to silence recognized in 
Hebert was defined narrowly. Anxious not to disrupt undercover opera-
tions generally, the majority explained that the right is only engaged 
when the suspect is detained and when the undercover operative elicits 
the statement.28 After Hebert, courts were uncertain whether and how 
this Charter right to silence applied in the context of interrogation by 
known police. A line of authority began to develop applying Hebert to 
traditional police interrogation: where a detainee’s repeated assertions of the 
right to silence were ignored in the context of unrelenting interrogation, 
                                                                                                             
21  Id., at para. 71. 
22  Id., at para. 104. 
23  Id., at para. 150. 
24  Section 7 provides: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and 
the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” 
25  [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hebert”]. 
26  Id., at 175. 
27  Id., at 186-87. 
28  Id., at 184-85. 
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some courts held that the police had impermissibly negated the detainee’s 
choice and therefore violated the section 7 right to silence.29 In these 
earlier cases, the right to silence implications of persistent interrogation 
were conceived as separate from any concerns about voluntariness, and the 
section 7 pre-trial right to silence was sometimes used to exclude even 
statements that had been ruled voluntary.30  
The Supreme Court clarified the relationship between the confes-
sions rule and the right to silence in Singh.31 The accused Singh was 
arrested for murder after a stray bullet killed a bystander in a pub. Singh 
consulted with counsel and, during subsequent police questioning, he 
asserted his right to silence some 18 times. Police repeatedly affirmed 
Singh’s right to silence but persisted with the interrogation, eventually 
eliciting some incriminating statements from him. The trial judge 
admitted the statements in evidence, finding that they were voluntary and 
that they were not obtained in violation of the Charter right to silence. 
The Supreme Court of Canada, by a 5-4 majority, dismissed Singh’s 
appeal from conviction. Justice Charron, for the majority,32 rejected the 
suggestion that police must cease questioning when a detainee asserts the 
right to silence. Indeed, the majority held that when a detainee is interro-
gated by known police, the section 7 right to silence provides no protec-
tion beyond the protection already offered by the confessions rule; “the 
confessions rule effectively subsumes the constitutional right to si-
lence”33 when a detainee is questioned by known police because, in that 
context, “the two tests are functionally equivalent.”34 Concerns that 
persistent interrogation in the face of repeated assertions of the right to 
silence may have overwhelmed a detainee’s free will should be dealt 
with — and may lead to exclusion — under the confessions rule.35 But 
where the Crown proves beyond a reasonable doubt that a detainee’s 
statement in the interrogation room was made voluntarily, there is no 
room left for a Charter claim that the statement was obtained in a manner 
                                                                                                             
29  See R. v. Otis, [2000] J.Q. no 4320, 151 C.C.C. (3d) 416 (Que. C.A.) [hereinafter “Otis”]; 
R. v. Roy, [2003] O.J. No. 4252, 15 C.R. (6th) 282 (Ont. C.A.). 
30  See, e.g., R. v. Reader, [2007] M.J. No. 225, 49 C.R. (6th) 301 (Man. Q.B.). 
31  Supra, note 4. 
32  Chief Justice McLachlin and Bastarache, Deschamps and Rothstein JJ. concurred with 
Charron J. 
33  Singh, supra, note 4, at para. 39. 
34  Id. 
35  Id., at para. 47. 
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that violated the section 7 right to silence.36 In the view of the majority, 
then, since the trial judge had fully considered the circumstances and 
found that the statements were voluntarily made, Singh’s Charter 
argument could not succeed. 
Justice Fish delivered a scathing dissent on behalf of four members 
of the Court.37 The dissenters stressed that, once asserted, a detainee’s 
right to silence should be respected and not deliberately undermined by 
police. Justice Fish acknowledged the significant overlap in the protec-
tion offered by the confessions rule and the right to silence, but insisted 
that in some circumstances a voluntary confession may nonetheless be 
obtained in violation of section 7.38 Moreover, the dissenters argued that 
if interrogators are permitted to ignore assertions of the right to silence 
and persist in questioning detainees under their total control, detainees 
“are bound to feel that their constitutional right to silence has no practical 
effect and that they in fact have no choice but to answer”.39 According to 
Fish J., Singh’s self-incriminating statements were obtained in violation 
of his section 7 right to silence because the police persistently disre-
garded his choice to remain silent. 
3. R. v. Sinclair and the Right to Counsel 
Section 10(b) of the Charter affords a person who has been arrested 
or detained the right “to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to 
be informed of that right”. As is clear from its language, section 10(b) 
imposes both informational and implementational duties on police: they 
must both inform the detainee of the right to counsel and offer the 
detainee a reasonable opportunity to exercise that right when the detainee 
indicates a desire to do so.40 In Sinclair,41 the Supreme Court considered 
the meaning of the right to counsel and the implementational duties of 
police in the context of custodial interrogation. The Court split over the 
issue, offering three very different interpretations of the right. 
                                                                                                             
36  Id., at paras. 8, 37. 
37  Justices Binnie, LeBel and Abella concurred with Fish J. 
38  Singh, supra, note 4, at paras. 75-77. 
39  Id., at para. 81. 
40  R. v. Bartle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 74, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173, 33 C.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.). 
41  Supra, note 1. See also the companion cases of R. v. McCrimmon, [2010] S.C.J. No. 36, 
[2010] 2 S.C.R. 402, 77 C.R. (6th) 266 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Willier, [2010] S.C.J. No. 37, [2010] 2 
S.C.R. 429, 77 C.R. (6th) 283 (S.C.C.), which applied the principles from Sinclair on different facts. 
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Sinclair was arrested for the killing of another man. He was advised 
of the reason for his arrest and of his right to counsel. He spoke to the 
lawyer of his choice twice for about three minutes each time. Later the 
same day, police interrogated Sinclair for five hours. He was told at the 
outset that he did not have to say anything and that the interview was 
being recorded and could be used in court. From the beginning, Sinclair 
took the position that he did not want to say anything without his lawyer 
present. The interrogator confirmed that Sinclair had the right not to 
speak, but explained that he did not have the right to have his counsel 
present during questioning.  
To encourage him to talk, police tried to convince Sinclair that the 
case against him was overwhelming. The interrogator repeatedly con-
fronted Sinclair with incriminating evidence, even falsely claiming that 
DNA evidence linked him to the crime scene. As questioning progressed, 
Sinclair repeatedly expressed (four to five times) a desire to speak with 
his lawyer and the intention to remain silent. Each time, the interrogator 
indicated that Sinclair had a choice whether to speak, then proceeded to 
further questioning. Eventually Sinclair described how he had fatally 
stabbed the victim. Later on, Sinclair made incriminating statements to 
an undercover officer in his cell and participated in a re-enactment at the 
scene of the killing.  
Chief Justice McLachlin and Charron J. delivered the judgment of 
the five-member majority.42 They rejected the proposition that section 
10(b) requires defence counsel to be present during custodial interroga-
tion.43 Instead, the majority explained, the right to counsel that arises 
upon detention is normally satisfied by the police doing two things: first, 
offering an initial warning informing the detainee of his or her right to 
counsel, and second, affording a reasonable opportunity to consult with 
counsel when the detainee invokes the right. After this initial consulta-
tion, section 10(b) does not guarantee the detainee the right to consult 
further with counsel in the course of the interrogation unless develop-
ments in the investigation indicate the need. Further consultation must be 
permitted where changed circumstances make it necessary to serve the 
purpose underlying section 10(b), which is to permit the detainee access 
to legal advice relevant to her legal situation and, specifically, to her right 
                                                                                                             
42  Justices Deschamps, Rothstein and Cromwell concurred. 
43  Sinclair, supra, note 1, at paras. 2, 33-42. 
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to choose whether to remain silent or cooperate with police.44 The 
changes in circumstances that trigger a right to consult further with 
counsel must be objectively observable; they include but are not limited 
to efforts by police to involve the detainee in new procedures like line-
ups, changes in the detainee’s jeopardy and indications that the initial 
information provided by counsel was deficient.45  
Applying the law to the circumstances, the majority held that Sin-
clair’s right to counsel was not violated. Sinclair was properly advised of 
his right to counsel and given an opportunity to exercise it by speaking to 
his lawyer twice. While the police exaggerated the strength of their case, 
the majority held that the right to consult further with counsel is not 
automatically triggered by police employing the common tactic of 
progressively revealing real or invented evidence against the detainee.46 
Thus, on the facts, no changed circumstances arose during the interroga-
tion to trigger a right to consult further with counsel.  
Dissenting reasons were delivered by Binnie J., who took the view 
that, together with the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the confessions 
rule and the right to silence in Oickle and Singh, the Sinclair majority’s 
analysis of the right to counsel improperly favoured the state interest in 
criminal investigations over individual rights.47 Justice Binnie agreed 
with the majority that section 10(b) does not guarantee the right to have 
one’s lawyer present during custodial interrogation.48 However, he 
rejected as overly restrictive the majority’s holding that section 10(b) 
grounds a right to consult further with counsel only in changed circum-
stances. In his view, a detainee’s right to consult further with counsel 
would be triggered in the evolving circumstances of an ongoing interro-
gation when the detainee makes a request to speak with counsel that 
satisfies two criteria. First, the request must be consistent with the 
purpose of section 10(b), which is to ensure access to legal assistance; 
requests designed to delay an investigation or serve as a distraction 
would not meet this criterion. Second, to trigger a right to consult further 
with counsel, the detainee’s request must be reasonably justified by 
objective circumstances apparent to police at the time of the interroga-
                                                                                                             
44  Id., at paras. 2, 25, 32, 47.  
45  Id., at paras. 49-55. 
46  Id., at para. 60. 
47  Id., at paras. 77, 93-99. 
48  Id., at paras. 82, 100-102. 
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tion.49 Emphasizing the risk of false confessions, Binnie J. disavowed a 
view of interrogation as an endurance contest between the detainee who 
has been advised not to speak and the police who try to wear him down.50  
On the facts, Binnie J. concluded that Sinclair’s right to consult fur-
ther with counsel was triggered after the police confronted him with what 
they claimed was overwhelming evidence against him. At that point, 
Sinclair’s renewed request to speak again with his lawyer was reasonable 
and justified in the evolving circumstances of the interrogation. The 
interrogator’s refusal to suspend the interrogation and allow Sinclair to 
consult with his lawyer at that time was a breach of section 10(b) 
warranting exclusion of all resulting statements. 
Separate dissenting reasons were delivered by LeBel and Fish JJ., 
with whom Abella J. concurred. They argued that the majority’s interpre-
tation of the right to counsel eroded the presumption of innocence and 
the principle against self-incrimination. In particular, they objected that 
the effect of the majority decisions in Sinclair and Singh was to grant 
police a right of “unfettered and continuing access to the detainee, for the 
purpose of conducting a custodial interview to the point of confession”.51 
Justices LeBel and Fish interpreted section 10(b) as grounding an 
ongoing right to counsel rather than a right that is exhausted after the 
detainee’s initial consultation with a lawyer.52 Emphasizing the impor-
tance of the right to counsel for detainees who are vulnerable and subject 
to the control of police, they insisted that detainees may exercise their 
right to counsel at any time upon request, and that the reasonableness of 
the request should not be subject to evaluation by police.53 Consequently, 
LeBel and Fish JJ. concluded that Sinclair’s section 10(b) right to 
counsel was violated when the police failed to suspend their interrogation 
and permit him to consult with counsel after his numerous requests to be 
allowed to do so. Like Binnie J., they would have excluded all Sinclair’s 
incriminating statements under section 24(2) of the Charter. 
                                                                                                             
49  Id., at paras. 80, 106. 
50  Id., at paras. 89-90. 
51  Id., at para. 190. 
52  Id., at para. 154. 
53  Id., at para. 177. 
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III. IMPACT OF THE TRILOGY 
For all the intense reaction they have provoked, the cases of the in-
terrogation trilogy made few changes to Canadian law. Oickle was 
primarily a restatement and consolidation of the existing law on volun-
tariness; what was new was the emphasis on reliability and the risk of 
false confessions.54 The principal contribution of Singh and Sinclair was 
to confirm that suspects are not entitled to stop a police interrogation by 
stating the intention to remain silent or the desire to re-consult with 
counsel. While perhaps disappointing, these holdings should not be 
surprising. Apart from a detainee’s initial assertion of the right to counsel 
— which obliges the police to hold off on questioning until the detainee 
has had a chance to consult with a lawyer55 — detainees in Canada have 
never had a power to cut off questioning simply by asserting their 
Charter rights.56 In fact, the holdings of the majority in Singh and 
Sinclair were, in large part, already expressly stated on behalf of a seven-
member majority of the Supreme Court when the Charter right to silence 
was first recognized in Hebert. Justice McLachlin held that, notwith-
standing the right to silence, police may try to persuade a detainee to 
speak: “The state is not obliged to protect the suspect against making a 
statement; indeed it is open to the state to use legitimate means of 
persuasion to encourage the suspect to do so.”57 Hebert also affirmed that 
police may question a detainee in the absence of counsel even after 
counsel has been retained.58 
It is true that Singh overturned the line of cases that had developed 
under section 7 holding that even a voluntary statement can be excluded 
on Charter grounds where police subject a detainee to unrelenting 
interrogation despite repeated attempts to assert the right to silence.59 
However, the majority’s disagreement was not with the proposition that 
incessant questioning of a reticent suspect can violate the right to silence, 
                                                                                                             
54  See, e.g., Gary T. Trotter, “False Confessions and Wrongful Confessions” (2004) 35 
Ottawa L. Rev. 179, at 186 [hereinafter “Trotter”]. 
55  R. v. Manninen, [1987] S.C.J. No. 41, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233, 58 C.R. (3d) 97, at para. 23 
(S.C.C.). 
56  For example, R. v. Wood, [1994] N.S.J. No. 542, 94 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at para. 115 
(N.S.C.A.) (“A detainee always has a right to a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel … [but] 
once he is informed he cannot, without more, stop an interrogation … merely by purporting to 
exercise his right to counsel again”). 
57  Hebert, supra, note 25, at 176-77. 
58  Id., at 184. 
59  See, supra, notes 29-30 and accompanying text. 
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but rather with the premise that such a violation could occur without also 
rendering the statement involuntary.60 Justice Charron explained that a 
statement may be excluded in these factual circumstances under the 
confessions rule because “police persistence in continuing the interview, 
despite repeated assertions by the detainee that he wishes to remain 
silent, may well raise a strong argument that any subsequently obtained 
statement was not the product of a free will to speak to the authorities.”61 
Thus, under Singh, these same considerations that might have been 
conceived in the earlier cases only as going to the section 7 right to 
silence can now be considered as factors going to voluntariness.62  
The courts have taken notice: since Singh there have been several 
reported cases where persistent questioning in the face of repeated 
assertions of the right to silence has contributed to a confession being 
excluded as involuntary.63 Not surprisingly, several other cases have 
decided, as the trial judge did in Singh, that persistent questioning did not 
render the statement involuntary in the circumstances.64 But the issue 
                                                                                                             
60  Tellingly, even as she suggested that the analysis should be undertaken under the confes-
sions rule, Charron J. cited with approval Otis, supra, note 29, in which the Quebec Court of Appeal 
found a violation of the Charter right to silence. 
61  Singh, supra, note 4, at para. 47. 
62  In the words of Charron J., id., at para. 37, “voluntariness, as it is understood today, re-
quires that the court scrutinize whether the accused was denied his or her right to silence”. 
63  See, e.g., R. v. S. (D.), [2010] O.J. No. 5748, 2011 ONSC 260 (Ont. S.C.J.) (the accused’s 
statements were involuntary when the police violated his right to counsel and persistently and at 
times confrontationally questioned him over his repeated protestations that he had nothing to say); R. 
v. C. (S.E.), [2009] M.J. No. 463, 2009 MBQB 242, at para. 29 (Man. Q.B.) (a confession was 
involuntary where the accused was intoxicated and drowsy and subjected in the middle of the night 
to “continued questioning over an extended period of time despite the defendant expressing his wish 
(on 13 occasions) to follow his lawyer’s advice not to make a statement”); R. v. Hankey, [2008] O.J. 
No. 2548, at para. 37 (Ont. S.C.J.) (the accused’s statements were involuntary because of “the 
cumulative effect of the context of the persistent questioning of the accused combined with the 
statements by the officer … which eroded the confidence of the accused in the legal advice he had 
received from counsel”); R. c. Côté, [2008] J.Q. no 7951, 2008 QCCS 3749 (Que. S.C.), affd [2011] 
S.C.J. No. 46, 2011 SCC 46 (S.C.C.) (statements obtained from the exhausted, claustrophobic 
accused after a lengthy detention, a patterns of violating her rights and persistent questioning in the 
face of repeated assertions of her right to silence were excluded as involuntary). 
64  See R. v. Borkowsky, [2008] M.J. No. 20, 225 Man. R. (2d) 127, at para. 48 (Man. C.A.) 
(in deciding that the accused’s statement was voluntary despite nine assertions that he wished to 
follow his lawyer’s advice and remain silent, the trial judge “made a judgment call that [was] 
supported by the record”); R. v. King, [2011] O.J. No. 532, 2011 ONSC 687 (Ont. S.C.J.) (the 
accused’s statements were voluntary despite 16 assertions of the right to silence and police 
misstating the law by suggesting it was his last chance to make a statement); R. v. Kembo, [2009] 
B.C.J. No. 2809, 2009 BCSC 1879, at para. 40 (B.C.S.C.) (the accused’s statements were voluntary 
after “the police chose to ignore his express wish to remain silent and used legitimate means of 
persuasion to get him to speak”); R. v. Dunsford, [2009] S.J. No. 373, 335 Sask. R. 43, at para. 16 
(Sask. Q.B.) (confession voluntary where “the accused, under persistent questioning by well 
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remains very much alive in the confessions cases.65 Contrary to the fears 
expressed by some, then, Singh has not had the effect of sanctioning utter 
disregard for assertions of the right to silence in the interrogation room.66  
By holding that concerns about the right to silence are subsumed by 
the voluntariness inquiry in the context of questioning by known police, 
the majority in Singh positioned the confessions rule as the central 
procedural safeguard for interrogated suspects. The same emphasis on 
the broad, residual protection offered by the confessions rule also appears 
in Sinclair. Admittedly, the connection between the right to counsel and 
the confessions rule is not as close as the nexus between the right to 
silence and the confessions rule. As the majority in Sinclair pointed out, 
voluntariness does not mean that the right to counsel has necessarily 
been respected, and neither does compliance with section 10(b) imply 
voluntariness.67 Still, McLachlin C.J.C. and Charron J. suggested in 
Sinclair that the confessions rule buttresses the right to counsel in the 
interrogation context: “We do not agree with the suggestion that our 
interpretation of s. 10(b) will give carte blanche to the police. This 
argument overlooks the requirement that confessions must be voluntary 
in the broad sense now recognized by the law.”68  
Moreover, in rejecting the suggestion of Binnie J. that the Court 
should recognize broader rights to re-consult with counsel under section 
10(b), the majority in Sinclair declared that “[t]he better approach is to 
continue to deal with claims of subjective incapacity or intimidation 
under the confessions rule.”69 Arguably, this reasoning implies that even 
                                                                                                             
prepared highly skilled interrogators, was rather easily persuaded to abandon his resolve, supported 
by his lawyer’s advice, not to respond to questions about the alleged crime”); R. v. Kematch, [2008] 
M.J. No. 468, 244 Man. R. (2d) 210 (Man. Q.B.) (statements by the accused were voluntary and 
motivated by conscience, even though he told police on a few occasions that his lawyer told him not 
to say anything); R. v. Shi, [2008] O.J. No. 5950, 2008 ONCJ 799 (Ont. C.J.) (the accused’s 
statement was voluntary despite his stating several times during the interrogation that his lawyer told 
him to remain silent). 
65  See R. v. Rybak, [2008] O.J. No. 1715, 90 O.R. (3d) 81, at para. 190 (Ont. C.A.), leave to 
appeal refused [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 311 (S.C.C.) (“A lengthy interview, coupled with repeated 
refusals to answer some questions without first speaking to a lawyer, mandate close judicial scrutiny 
of the admissibility of the record of interview”). 
66  See Suhail Akhtar, “Whatever Happened to the Right to Silence?” (2009) 62 C.R. (6th) 
73, at 85 (“After the decision in Singh, there was some complaint that the police had the right to ride 
roughshod over the wishes of the accused … [but s]uch an approach, aside from Charter implica-
tions, would more than likely render any statement made inadmissible through the voluntariness 
rubric”). 
67  Sinclair, supra, note 1, at para. 29. 
68  Id., at para. 62. 
69  Id., at para. 60. 
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if repeated assertions of one’s desire to speak again with one’s lawyer do 
not give rise to a right to consult further with counsel under the major-
ity’s changed circumstances test, they may militate against a finding of 
voluntariness in the particular circumstances. Even in the months since 
Sinclair was decided, courts have acknowledged the ways in which the 
section 10(b) right to counsel and the voluntariness inquiry can be 
interrelated.70 Consider the case of R. v. Delormier,71 in which statements 
from the accused were excluded as involuntary for a variety of reasons, 
including veiled threats from police that the accused’s children might be 
taken away if she did not cooperate. For present purposes, the case is 
notable because Power J. considered the accused’s repeated requests to 
have her lawyer present or speak with him again as a factor tending to 
suggest that her statements were involuntary. 
In sum, the interrogation trilogy has not created any dramatic move-
ment in Canadian law, but the cases do have some interesting implica-
tions. Taken together, Singh and Sinclair clearly reject the notion that an 
interrogated suspect should have the power to cut off interrogation by 
invoking the right to silence or the right to re-consult with counsel. These 
two cases also emphasize the role of the confessions rule as outlined in 
Oickle in providing broad protection for interrogated suspects that 
enhances and complements the safeguards available under sections 7 and 
10(b) of the Charter. These two features of the interrogation trilogy, 
including their advantages and disadvantages, will be explored for the 
balance of this paper.  
IV. NO CUT-OFF RULES 
The most controversial feature of the interrogation trilogy is that it 
denies interrogated suspects the power to stop police questioning by 
asserting their Charter rights. Under the well-known Miranda rules in the 
                                                                                                             
70  See, e.g., R. v. Gonzales, [2011] O.J. No. 395, 2011 ONSC 543, at para. 23 (Ont. S.C.J.) 
(failure to re-inform accused of his rights to silence and counsel when he faced new jeopardy 
breached s. 10(b) and raised a reasonable doubt about voluntariness because the accused may have 
been given “the impression that he was required to give a statement”); R. v. Somogyi, [2010] O.J. 
No. 4350, 221 C.R.R. (2d) 49 (Ont. S.C.J.) (statements drawn out of an autistic man with relentless, 
aggressive questioning that created an atmosphere of oppression were involuntary, and this 
conclusion was reinforced by the fact that police breached the accused’s right to counsel when they 
did not permit him to consult further with counsel after it became clear that he did not understand 
that the duty counsel he had earlier spoken to was a lawyer). 
71  [2010] O.J. No. 5708, 2010 ONSC 7191 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
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United States, custodial interrogation must cease when the detainee 
asserts the right to remain silent, and police are prohibited from question-
ing detainees in the absence of their lawyers once they have asserted the 
right to counsel.72 The appellants in Singh and Sinclair urged the Su-
preme Court to adopt such “questioning cut-off rules”73 under the 
Charter. Singh argued that police should be required to stop questioning a 
detainee who states an intention not to speak,74 while Sinclair submitted 
that police must cease questioning when a detainee requests the opportu-
nity to consult again with counsel.75 These arguments were largely 
accepted by the dissenters in the two cases. The dissenting judgment in 
Singh is somewhat unclear on this point: some of its language suggests 
that even one assertion of the right to silence should put an end to police 
questioning,76 but other parts of the judgment trace the violation of 
section 7 to the “persistent disregard” of the accused’s choice to remain 
silent.77 In Sinclair, by contrast, the dissenting judgment of LeBel and 
Fish JJ. clearly accepts that detainees have a right to cut off questioning 
by asserting their Charter rights even once. In their words, “detainees 
who demand access to counsel before being further subjected to relent-
less interrogation against their will … are constitutionally entitled ‘to 
speak to [their] lawyer NOW’.”78 
Whatever the position of the dissenting judges, the majority judg-
ments in Singh and Sinclair have firmly established that questioning cut-
off rules do not form a part of Canadian constitutional law. The majority 
judges offered two justifications for their rejection of American-style 
interrogation cut-off rules. First, they argued that giving detainees the 
unilateral power to stop interrogations would upset the balance between 
individual rights and society’s interest in enforcing the criminal law.79 In 
Singh, the majority went so far as to claim that the argument that interro-
                                                                                                             
72  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1966). 
73  This descriptor is drawn from the American legal literature: e.g., Paul G. Cassell, “Pro-
tecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost Confessions — and from Miranda” (1998) 88 
J. Crim. L. & Criminology 497, at fn. 216.  
74  Singh, supra, note 4, at para. 6. 
75  Sinclair, supra, note 1, at para. 18. 
76  Singh, supra, note 4, at para. 70 (“A right that need not be respected after it has been 
firmly and unequivocally asserted any number of times is a constitutional promise that has not been 
kept”) (emphasis in original).  
77  Id., at para. 95. See also id., at para. 70 (“I … find it unnecessary to decide whether 18 
times is too many or once is too few”).  
78  Sinclair, supra, note 1, at para. 177. 
79  See, e.g., id., at para. 63.  
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gation should cease upon assertion of the detainee’s right to silence 
“ignores the state interest in the effective investigation of crime”.80 At 
least in its strong form, this justification for rejecting cut-off rules seems 
misguided. The long American experience with such rules fatally 
undermines any claim that their adoption would devastate Canadian law 
enforcement.81 This justification carries some limited force, however, in 
its weaker form. Adopting cut-off rules would shut down some interroga-
tions and thereby hamper criminal investigations in some measure, and 
even a modest effect on law enforcement seems to be a legitimate (but 
not decisive) factor in considering the scope of individual rights. 
The second justification offered by the majority for rejecting cut-off 
rules is that such rules are grounded in the mistaken notion that being 
compelled to endure questioning amounts to compulsory self-
incrimination.82 In principle at least, there does seem to be a distinction 
between being made to listen and being forced to speak. On the other 
hand, the psychological pressures of police interrogation, particularly in 
the context of detention, may be strong enough to make it unrealistic to 
expect detainees to exercise their right to silence in the face of persistent 
questioning.83 Sensitivity to the inherent pressures of police interrogation 
probably explains why most commentators view the Supreme Court’s 
rejection of cut-off rules as disappointing. It appears that, in Singh and 
Sinclair, the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to guarantee that the 
Charter rights to silence and counsel, once asserted, can be effectively 
exercised in the interrogation room. 
It would be a mistake, however, to focus on this missed opportunity 
and forget the safeguards that do exist for interrogated suspects in 
Canadian law. The fact that police may continue to question a detainee 
even after an assertion of the right to silence or counsel does not mean, 
as Don Stuart has suggested, that “the right to remain silent does not … 
exist”.84 It does not, as the dissenters wrote in Sinclair, grant police the 
                                                                                                             
80  Supra, note 4, at para. 45. 
81  See, e.g., Ives & Sherrin, supra, note 6, at 251-53; Singh, id., at para. 89 (Fish J., dissenting). 
82  Singh, id., at para. 28; Sinclair, supra, note 1, at para. 63. 
83  See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, “Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and 
Vanishingly small Social Costs” (1996) 90 Nw. U.L. Rev. 500, at 558 (the distinction between 
compelling a detainee to submit to questioning and compelling a self-incriminating statement should 
be abandoned because “[i]n the context of custodial interrogation, there is only a slender conceptual 
difference here, not a practical difference that can possibly matter”). 
84  Stuart, “Sinclair Regrettably”, supra, note 6, at 307. 
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right to interrogate a detainee “to the point of confession”.85 The majority 
judges in both Singh and Sinclair were at pains to point out that where an 
interrogation becomes overbearing and negates the detainee’s freedom of 
choice about whether to speak to authorities, the right to silence will be 
violated and any resulting statement will be involuntary and inadmissible 
pursuant to the confessions rule. 
The safeguards available in Canadian law arguably have some ad-
vantages over a system of interrogation cut-off rules. As the majority 
pointed out in Sinclair, empirical research in the United States indicates 
that around 80 per cent of suspects waive their Miranda rights to silence 
and counsel.86 This is not to suggest that those rights are unimportant; no 
doubt they operate as crucial safeguards for the minority of detainees 
who invoke them. What the high waiver rate does show is that cut-off 
rules in and of themselves cannot function as an adequate systemic 
response to the danger of coercion in police interrogation. Surely it 
would be preferable to conduct a case-by-case analysis of the circum-
stances of every confession and exclude all coerced statements whether 
the rights to silence and counsel were invoked or not. This is what the 
confessions rule aims to do. 
Potentially, a robust confessions rule could co-exist with interroga-
tion cut-off rules, in which case there is no need to choose between them 
and interrogated suspects could have the benefit of both. Yet, the Ameri-
can experience casts some doubt on the idea that the voluntariness 
inquiry would maintain its vitality alongside a system centred on warn-
ings and cut-off rules. In the United States, as in Canada, confessions are 
supposed to be admissible only if they are voluntary.87 But commentators 
have observed that, since the Miranda regime was adopted, the admissi-
bility of a confession in an American court depends almost entirely on 
whether the proper warnings were given and the necessary waivers of 
                                                                                                             
85  Sinclair, supra, note 1, at para. 190. 
86  Id., at para. 41; Richard A. Leo, “Inside the Interrogation Room” (1995) 86 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 266, at 276 (reporting a study involving real police interrogations, in which 78 per cent 
of interrogated suspects waived their Miranda rights); Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, “Police 
Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda” (1996) 43 UCLA L. Rev. 
839, at 860 (discussing an empirical study in which 79.9 per cent of suspects waived their Miranda 
rights throughout the custodial interrogation, while another 3.9 per cent initially waived their rights 
but invoked them at some point during questioning).  
87  The voluntariness standard applies as a matter of due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 
1936). 
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rights obtained.88 American judges appear content to rely on the safe-
guards provided by Miranda, to the exclusion of a thorough voluntari-
ness inquiry. In the words of Steven Duke, “Miranda is a substantial 
factor in the twenty-first century reality that the suppression of confes-
sions by trial judges on involuntariness grounds is almost as rare today as 
four-legged chickens.”89  
Of course, one can only speculate about what would happen to the 
confessions rule if interrogation cut-off rules were incorporated into 
Canadian law. Yet one cannot dismiss the possibility that adopting 
Miranda-type rules, including questioning cut-off rules, would under-
mine the voluntariness standard for confessions. Moreover, there is every 
reason to expect that such cut-off rules would provide no protection at all 
to most interrogated suspects, because they would never invoke their 
rights. By contrast, the confessions rule has the advantage of requiring a 
contextual inquiry into the whole circumstances of every confession. 
V. VOLUNTARINESS AT THE CENTRE 
The interrogation trilogy identifies the confessions rule as the central 
safeguard for interrogated suspects, a safeguard that supports and 
overlaps with the Charter rights to silence and counsel. This emphasis on 
the broad protection offered by the confessions rule was criticized by the 
dissenting judges in Sinclair and Singh. In the words of LeBel and Fish 
JJ., “the suggestion … that our residual concerns can be meaningfully 
addressed by way of the confessions rule … ignores what we have 
learned about the dynamics of custodial interrogation and renders 
pathetically anemic the entrenched constitutional rights to counsel and 
silence.”90 Clearly these comments bespeak a high degree of skepticism 
about the confessions rule. The analysis in the pages that follow will 
consider whether this skepticism is justified. The reasons to mistrust the 
protection offered by the confessions rule include its common law status, 
its indeterminacy and the results of several recent Supreme Court of 
Canada cases considering voluntariness. On the other hand, the courts’ 
                                                                                                             
88  For example, Charles D. Weisselberg, “Mourning Miranda” (2008) 96 Cal. L. Rev. 1519, 
at 1595 [hereinafter “Weisselberg”] (from a law enforcement perspective, “the reason Miranda is 
advantageous is that it has practically displaced voluntariness determinations”). 
89  Steven B. Duke, “Does Miranda Protect the Innocent or the Guilty?” (2007) 10 Chapman 
L. Rev. 551, at 562. 
90  Sinclair, supra, note 1, at para. 184 (emphasis in original). 
(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d)  THE INTERROGATION TRILOGY 327 
 
focus on the confessions rule has real virtues that arguably outweigh 
these concerns.  
One potential concern about relying on the confessions rule as the 
principal protection for interrogated suspects is that it seems incongruous 
to favour a common law rule over constitutional standards. At least in the 
context of interrogation, the section 7 right to silence in particular seems 
almost to disappear in the shadow of the confessions rule. That constitu-
tional right has no independent remedy in this context because Singh 
established that the voluntariness inquiry contains and resolves any 
question about right to silence in interrogation.91 One might argue that 
this approach negates the section 7 right to silence.92 Yet, if we take the 
view that the actual availability of procedural protections matters more 
than their legal source, then relying on the confessions rule seems less 
problematic: potentially, the right to silence can be vindicated as fully 
through the confessions rule as through a distinct section 7 analysis. Of 
course, if the confessions rule were abrogated, it would become 
necessary for Courts to decide the limits of the right to silence under 
section 7. For now, according to the Supreme Court, the confessions rule 
adequately protects the suspect’s right to remain silent in the face of 
interrogation. 
The more challenging objection to the courts’ reliance on the residual 
protection offered by the confessions rule is that that protection is weak 
and inadequate. Certainly there are reasons to doubt its adequacy. For 
one thing, the confessions rule can be frustratingly indeterminate. The 
rule requires a contextual analysis of the totality of the circumstances 
relevant to voluntariness. And while the law has a lot to say about the 
factors that bear on voluntariness, the reality is that trial judges enjoy 
wide latitude in reaching a conclusion on the issue. As the rule was 
outlined in Oickle, it imposes few firm limits on interrogation. Oickle did 
indicate that confessions extracted with actual or threatened physical 
violence will be involuntary,93 but it appears that no other interrogation 
tactics are entirely prohibited under the rule. Even when police offer a 
quid pro quo for a confession in the form of a threat or a promise, the 
Court held that such inducements only vitiate voluntariness when they 
“are strong enough to raise a reasonable doubt about whether the will of 
                                                                                                             
91  See supra, notes 33-36 and accompanying text. 
92  See Stuart, “Sinclair Regrettably”, supra, note 6, at 307 (arguing that the right to silence 
no longer exists because it has no Charter remedy). 
93  Oickle, supra, note 3, at paras. 48, 53. 
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the subject has been overborne”.94 Some commentators have suggested 
that the confessions rule should be strengthened by recognizing firmer 
limits on police conduct,95 but the Supreme Court in Oickle disavowed 
“[h]ard and fast” rules as inconsistent with the overall contextual 
approach to voluntariness.96  
The very language of the confessions rule attests to its indetermi-
nacy: to be admissible, confessions must be proven “voluntary”. Histori-
cally, the rule excluded as involuntary those statements obtained by “fear 
of prejudice or hope of advantage exercised or held out by a person in 
authority”,97 but the modern cases, especially Oickle, indicate that threats 
and promises are only a part of a larger inquiry into voluntariness. Often, 
as in Oickle, the language of voluntariness is left to stand essentially on 
its own as the full articulation of the test. When other language is used, it 
is the language of free will, choice and the overborne will.98 Without 
engaging in philosophical debates about the nature of human action, how 
can a judge answer the question whether a statement was made voluntar-
ily, as a product of the suspect’s free will?99 In almost all cases, there will 
be some element of choice and some external constraint or pressure that, 
together, give rise to the statement.100 A cursory review of the confes-
sions cases reveals that involuntariness does not equate with a total 
absence of volitional action akin to automatism. On the other hand, 
                                                                                                             
94  Id., at para. 57. On this point, see R. v. Spencer, [2007] S.C.J. No. 11, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 
500, 44 C.R. (6th) 199 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Spencer”]. 
95  See, e.g., Ives, supra, note 6, at 498 (suggesting that the Court should “partially abandon 
the totality of the circumstances approach to assessing voluntariness and, instead, begin the process 
of regulating more directly the conduct of interrogations and permissibility of certain interrogation 
techniques”). See also Lisa Dufraimont, “The Common Law Confessions Rule in the Charter Era: 
Current Law and Future Directions” in Jamie Cameron & James Stribopoulos, eds. (2008) 40 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 249, at 258-60 [hereinafter “Dufraimont”]. 
96  Oickle, supra, note 3, at para. 47. 
97  R. v. Ibrahim, [1914] A.C. 599, at 609 (P.C.), adopted in Canada in R. v. Prosko, [1922] 
S.C.J. No. 6, 63 S.C.R. 226 (S.C.C.). 
98  For example, the majority in Singh, supra, note 4, at para. 53, stated that under both the 
confessions rule and the right to silence, “[t]he ultimate question is whether the accused exercised 
free will by choosing to make a statement.” 
99  See Ronald J. Allen, “Miranda’s Hollow Core” (2006) 100 Nw. U.L. Rev. 71, at 76 (ar-
guing that it is impossible to “distinguish between ‘free will’ and ‘compelled’ statements. … it 
seems inescapable that either free will always exists in the sense that one always has choices one can 
make, or more likely it never exists because we live in a deterministic world”). 
100  Hamish Stewart, “The Confessions Rule and the Charter” (2009) 54 McGill L.J. 517, at 
540 [hereinafter “Stewart”] (“in a typical case of wrongful pressure, the conduct of the person whose 
will is said to be overborne is fully voluntary and rational; it is a deliberate, though highly 
constrained, effort to avoid an unpleasant consequence”). 
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recalling the principle that the police may use “legitimate means of 
persuasion”101 to encourage a suspect to speak, it seems equally clear that 
voluntariness does not require an unconstrained will, liberated from any 
external influence. Ultimately, the voluntariness rule demands a will that 
is not entirely free but free enough — free from pressure that, in all the 
circumstances, seems illegitimate. Inescapably, it is a muddy, line-
drawing exercise. The indeterminacy of the confessions rule gives some 
reason to be skeptical that the voluntariness standard can provide 
meaningful, consistent protection to interrogated suspects.   
This skepticism has been fed, in recent years, with unease about a 
number of cases in which the Supreme Court has upheld findings of 
voluntariness in troubling circumstances. Oickle and Singh are examples 
of cases where the Court has countenanced police conduct that pushes 
the line between persuasion and coercion.102 Another example is R. v. 
Spencer,103 where the Supreme Court reinstated the trial judge’s finding 
that the accused’s confessions to robbery were voluntary even though the 
police withheld a visit to his girlfriend until he “cleaned his slate”.104 The 
trial judge concluded that this inducement was not strong enough to raise 
a reasonable doubt about whether the accused’s free will was overborne, 
and a majority of the Supreme Court agreed. Some have suggested that 
Spencer changed the voluntariness test in the Crown’s favour, since the 
trial judge relied on a Court of Appeal holding in R. v. Paternak105 that 
voluntariness turns on whether “the detainee has lost any meaningfully 
independent ability to choose to remain silent, and has become a mere 
tool in the hands of the police”.106 However, the majority of the Supreme 
Court in Spencer explicitly distanced itself from this “colourful lan-
guage”107 and upheld the trial judge’s findings on the basis that he 
                                                                                                             
101  Hebert, supra, note 25, at 176-77. 
102  Don Stuart has written that “the Supreme Court rulings on voluntariness on the facts of 
Oickle and Singh give no comfort for those seeking such judicial control on aggressive interrogation 
determined to get the detainee to confess at all costs. The Court has proved far too tolerant of truly 
coercive interrogations in these high profile cases. ...” Stuart, “Sinclair Regrettably”, supra, note 6, 
at 307. See also Thomas, supra, note 6 (carefully reviewing the troubling features of the interroga-
tion in Oickle). 
103  Spencer, supra, note 94. 
104  Id., at para. 8. 
105  [1995] A.J. No. 795, 101 C.C.C. (3d) 452 (Alta. C.A.). 
106  Id., at para. 27 (emphasis in original). For discussion of whether the reference to  
Paternak in Spencer changed the voluntariness test from Oickle, see Ives & Sherrin, supra, note 6, at 
259-60. 
107  Spencer, supra, note 94, at para. 19. 
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repeatedly referred to the appropriate standard of proof and to the 
decision in Oickle.108 In light of this reasoning, it is difficult to maintain 
that Spencer should be read as changing the voluntariness test. Still, 
Spencer represents one further instance of the Supreme Court finding 
confessions voluntary despite police use of some questionable interroga-
tion techniques. 
A partial answer to worries about these troubling cases is that the 
Supreme Court has maintained a high standard of deference to trial 
judges on the issue of voluntariness,109 a deference that is arguably 
appropriate in light of the fact-driven, contextual nature of the inquiry. 
Notwithstanding this deference argument, the Supreme Court’s recent 
decisions on the facts of confessions cases, coupled with the indetermi-
nacy of the rule itself, raise legitimate concerns about the strength of the 
protection that the confessions rule offers to interrogated suspects. 
It will be argued here, however, that these real concerns about the 
confessions rule are outweighed by the benefits of privileging it as the 
central safeguard for interrogated suspects. The principal benefits are 
three. First, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly observed, the accused 
benefits from certain procedural advantages when relying on the confes-
sions rule. The Crown bears the burden of establishing voluntariness and 
involuntary statements are automatically excluded from evidence, 
whereas the accused must establish a Charter breach and statements 
obtained in violation of Charter rights are only excluded under section 
24(2) if their admission “would bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute”.110 Second, as has already been discussed, the confessions rule 
casts its protection over all interrogated suspects, since all confessions 
must be shown to be voluntary before they can be entered in evidence. 
This wide scope of protection means that the confessions rule is better 
suited to be the central protection for interrogated suspects than, for 
example, the questioning cut-off rules that were rejected in Singh and 
Sinclair. 
                                                                                                             
108  See id., at para. 19:  
Arguably, taken out of context, the impugned passage from Paternak appears to overstate 
the test in Oickle since it does not make reference to the quid pro quo or to the reasonable 
doubt standard. However, it is clear from reading the trial judge’s reasons that he did not 
commit these errors, since he expressly and repeatedly referred to the proper standard of 
proof and to this Court’s decision in Oickle. 
109  See Stewart, supra, note 100, at 543. 
110  Charter, s. 24(2). For discussion of these differences, see Singh, supra, note 4, at para. 38, 
citing Oickle, supra, note 3, at paras. 29-31. 
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The third advantage of the confessions rule is the breadth of the vol-
untariness analysis, which encompasses a wide range of factors concern-
ing the risk of false confessions, the limits of acceptable police conduct, 
the psychological dynamics of interrogation and the vulnerabilities of the 
individual suspect. It is well established that the confessions rule has two 
main purposes: to exclude unreliable statements and to protect individu-
als from coercive and improper interrogation tactics.111 Since the touch-
stone of admissibility is “voluntariness, broadly understood”,112 a 
confession can be excluded because of concerns about its reliability, on 
grounds related to improper police conduct, or for both kinds of reasons. 
In Oickle, the Supreme Court confirmed that voluntariness can be 
vitiated by a range of factors including threats and promises, oppression, 
a failure to meet the operating mind requirement and shocking police 
trickery. Beyond these categories, the Court drew liberally on social 
science literature on the psychology of interrogation and encouraged 
courts to approach the voluntariness inquiry mindful of the tactics and 
factors that contribute to false confessions.113 For example, Iacobucci J. 
emphasized the need to be sensitive to the vulnerabilities of individual 
suspects114 and conscious that the common tactic of confronting suspects 
with “non-existent evidence” risks overwhelming even the innocent, who 
may come to believe that their “protestations of innocence are futile”.115   
The already broad range of considerations bearing on voluntariness 
has arguably now been further expanded by Singh and Sinclair. As 
discussed above, Singh expressly stated that unrelenting questioning of a 
suspect in the face of repeated assertions of the right to silence can make 
a confession involuntary. This result could well have been achieved even 
before Singh by applying the doctrine of oppression, but if there was any 
doubt on the matter it has now been resolved by Singh.116 Moreover, as 
                                                                                                             
111  For example, Stewart, supra, note 100, at 527; Singh, id., at para. 21 (“Although histori-
cally the confessions rule was more concerned with the reliability of confessions than the protection 
against self-incrimination, this no longer holds true in the post-Charter era”). 
112  Oickle, supra, note 3, at para. 27.  
113  Trotter, supra, note 54, at 181 (“Oickle is significant for its absorption of the growing 
body of social science literature on false confessions and police interrogation practices”). See also 
Dufraimont, supra, note 95, at 258. 
114  Oickle, supra, note 3, at para. 42. 
115  Id., at para. 43. 
116  This reasoning answers the claim that certain violations of the right to silence in the inter-
rogation context will not be caught by the confessions rule, which has been raised by some 
commentators and by the dissent in Singh, supra, note 4 and Sinclair, supra, note 1, at para. 185. In 
an article written after Singh, Hamish Stewart purported to offer an example of a situation where an 
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argued above, Sinclair can be read as suggesting that repeated requests to 
speak with one’s lawyer, like repeated assertions of the right to silence, 
can militate against a finding of voluntariness. 
The myriad factors that can affect the voluntariness of a confession 
have the disadvantage of adding to the indeterminacy of the confessions 
rule; they cannot be reduced to a test to be applied with analytical 
precision. But the breadth of the inquiry makes the confessions rule a 
good vehicle for addressing the complex policy issues surrounding 
interrogation and confessions. The confessions rule gives the courts a 
way to respond not just to abusive police tactics, but also to vulnerable 
suspects and unreliable statements.  
Admittedly, certain of the themes of the confessions rule identified 
here need to be developed further in future cases. For example, vulner-
abilities of individual suspects resulting from factors like youth and 
mental disability are known to be a major factor contributing to false 
confessions.117 While the Supreme Court in Oickle cautioned judges to 
be mindful of these vulnerabilities in the voluntariness inquiry, there was 
little discussion of how that analysis should work.118 Few would deny 
that the law should develop a more sophisticated response to the vulner-
abilities of interrogated suspects; the advantage of the confessions rule is 
that it provides a doctrinal opening for that development. In her critique 
of Sinclair, Christine Boyle observed that the majority’s discussion of 
section 10(b) seems insensitive to the “varying vulnerabilities of detained 
persons”.119 She noted that it seems “disturbing … that agents of the state 
should be able to keep women isolated, not to mention people with 
mental disabilities and people with good reason to be terrified of police 
                                                                                                             
interrogation would result in a voluntary confession despite breaching the suspect’s right to silence: 
Stewart, supra, note 100, at 539. In this example, the youthful and vulnerable suspect asserts the 
intention to remain silent but is persuaded to speak after repeated requests from the police. Stewart 
posits that there are no improper inducements, oppression or other factors that would make the 
statement involuntary. The problem is that the example as framed contains factors that could 
combine to vitiate voluntariness: the suspect’s youth and vulnerability and the persistence of the 
police. It also seems problematic to posit that there is no oppression, since the persistent questioning 
would seem capable of creating an atmosphere of oppression.  
117  See, e.g., Christopher Sherrin, “False Confessions and Admissions in Canadian Law” 
(2005) 30 Queen’s L.J. 601, at 629 [hereinafter “Sherrin”] (reviewing the “individual factors that 
could prompt a person to falsely incriminate him or herself”). 
118  See Ives, supra, note 6, at 483 (lauding the Court’s recognition that the suspect’s vulne-
rabilities can affect the overall voluntariness inquiry, but noting that Oickle does not provide much 
guidance on how to approach this issue); Sherrin, id., at 639-56. 
119  Boyle, supra, note 6, at 314. 
(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d)  THE INTERROGATION TRILOGY 333 
 
officers”.120 One answer to this concern is that, by emphasizing the 
residual protection offered by the confessions rule, the majority in 
Sinclair provided a means for those problems of vulnerability to be 
addressed. 
In sum, with its multidimensional contextual analysis, the confes-
sions rule has the potential to ground meaningful responses to the 
overlapping problems of false confessions and police abuse in the 
interrogation room. Of course, much depends on how individual judges 
apply the voluntariness standard. As Don Stuart observed in his commen-
tary on Sinclair, “the hope for a better balance now lies … with trial 
judges presiding over voluntary confession voir dires.”121 There seems to 
be some reason for optimism, as a review of the confessions cases 
reveals that trial judges often show sensitivity to the coercive pressure of 
interrogation in ruling confessions involuntary.122 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While the cases of the interrogation trilogy did not work any major 
change in Canadian law, they have provoked a strong reaction that merits 
a close analysis of their implications. Taken together, Singh and Sinclair 
have confirmed that American-style questioning cut-off rules find no 
place in Canadian law. There are, in short, no magic words that a 
detainee can utter to bring an end to an interrogation. Since such cut-off 
rules amount to simple procedural guarantees capable of ensuring that 
unequivocal assertions of the rights to silence and counsel are given full 
effect, and since the majority’s reasons for rejecting them in Singh and 
Sinclair were not entirely persuasive, it seems fair to conclude that the 
Court has missed an opportunity to enhance the protection of these 
Charter rights.  
At the same time, the significance of this missed opportunity should 
not be exaggerated. Even if questioning cut-off rules were adopted in 
Canada, they would probably not assist most interrogated suspects 
because only a small minority could be expected to invoke their rights. 
The dangers of coercion in the interrogation room clearly require a 
broader systemic response. Despite its acknowledged flaws, the confes-
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122  See supra, notes 63, 70-71 and accompanying text. See also the cases cited by Stuart, id. 
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sions rule as outlined in Oickle is well suited to provide that broader 
protection. Consequently, in Singh and Sinclair, the majority of the 
Supreme Court positioned the confessions rule as the central safeguard 
for interrogated suspects, a safeguard that supports and complements the 
Charter rights to silence and counsel.  
American scholar Charles Weisselberg has written that the Miranda 
regime of warnings and waivers should be abandoned because it fails to 
provide meaningful protection for most people subjected to custodial 
interrogation. In its place, he advocated a system in which judges 
would be required to assess the voluntariness of statements in light of 
all the circumstances, including suspects’ age, education, the existence 
of any mental disabilities or disorders, the application of sophisticated 
interrogation tactics, express and implied promises, and other factors, 
shorn of the unwarranted assumption that all suspects somehow 
understand form warnings and are empowered thereby.123 
A Canadian reader cannot help but be reminded of our confessions rule, 
which at least has the potential to take account of these factors that are so 
crucial to the dynamics of police interrogation. 
                                                                                                             
123  Weisselberg, supra, note 88, at 1598-99. 
